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Unconscionability and Impracticability:
Reflections on Two U.C.C.
Indeterminacy Principles
GERALD T. MCLAUGHLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In The House at Pooh Corner, Rabbit says of Owl, "[Y]ou can't
help respecting [some]body who can spell TUESDAY, even if he
doesn't spell it ight... ."I While I would not go so far as to say that
one should respect someone who can spell both "unconscionability"
and "impracticability" and get their spellings right, I might go so far
as to say that one should respect someone who can use both doctrines
and use them correctly. Although Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code ("U.C.C.") includes provisions covering both unconsciona-
bility2 and impracticability, 3 these provisions are not exactly blinding
in their clarity.
This Article first briefly describes the analytical framework ap-
plied in Article 2 unconscionability cases. It demonstrates that a judi-
cial determination of unconscionability is the product of a two-
pronged analysis. The first prong of the analysis, usually referred to
as "procedural unconscionability, ' '4 focuses on the contractual bar-
gaining process to determine whether that process has been tainted by
"bargaining naughtiness." 5 The second prong of the analysis, usually
referred to as "substantive unconscionability, '" 6 focuses on the fairness
of the actual terms of the contract. The Article will show that despite
this analytical framework, unconscionability is an Article 2 doctrine
that is essentially indeterminate in definition. The flexibility of uncon-
scionability allows a court to excuse contractual performance when-
* Dean and Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. B.A.,
Fordham University, 1963; LL.B., New York University School of Law, 1966.
1. A.A. MILNE, THE HOUSE AT POOH CORNER 76 (1928).
2. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990). See also U.C.C. section 2A-108 (1990) for a similar provision
on unconscionability that applies to leases of goods.
3. Id. § 2-615 (1990).
4. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 509.
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ever, in its view, continued performance would be unfair or
inequitable.
This Article next demonstrates that impracticability is likewise a
doctrine that is essentially indeterminate in definition. The product of
a two-pronged analysis not unlike the procedural-substantive analysis
for unconscionability, impracticability also allows courts to excuse
performance on the grounds of fairness and equity.
Finally, this Article concludes that even though unconscionabil-
ity and impracticability are both indeterminate in definition, courts
are far more willing to excuse performance on the ground of uncon-
scionability than on the ground of impracticability, due mainly to the
status of the parties seeking excuse in each case.
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY
A. Overview
The amount of scholarly literature in the United States on the
topic of unconscionability is enormous.7 In a short reflective piece
such as this, no attempt will be made to review this literature.
Rather, knowledge of its contents will be assumed in the subsequent
discussion.
U.C.C. section 2-302 is the Article 2 provision on unconsciona-
bility. It reads:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the con-
tract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making
7. See, e.g., William B. Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121 (1967); M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78
YALE L.J. 757 (1969); E. Alan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agree-
ments: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987); Bruce W. Frier,
One Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws: Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2201
(1991); Leff, supra note 4, at 485; Gerald T. McLaughlin & Neil B. Cohen, Unconscionability
and Consequential Damages, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 15, 1992, at 3; Michael J. Phillips, Unconsciona-
bility and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62 CHi-KENT L. REV. 199 (1985); John A.
Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969).
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the determination.8
Section 2-302 tells us several things about the doctrine of uncon-
scionability. First, section 2-302(1) demonstrates that unconsciona-
bility must exist at the time the contract for sale is made, not at some
later time.9 Consequently, if a contract for sale is found to be fair and
balanced at the time the contract is entered into, it will not be consid-
ered unconscionable, even if at the time of performance the contract is
found to be unfair and unbalanced.' 0
Second, section 2-302(1) states that unconscionability must be
found by the court "as a matter of law.""II Unlike questions of good
faith,' 2 unconscionability is not a question of fact to be decided by a
jury. Therefore, since unconscionability is a question of law, an ap-
pellate court can review a trial court's conclusion of unconscionability
de noVo,13 while a jury determination on the question would normally
be respected. Reserving the question of unconscionability for court
determination emphasizes the equitable origins of the doctrine of
unconscionability.'4
Third, section 2-302(2) provides that a court can raise the issue
of unconscionability sua sponte.I5 Specifically, the section states that
"[w]hen [unconscionability] is claimed or appears to the court," the
parties shall be afforded an opportunity to present evidence to aid the
court in making its ultimate determination.' 6 Again, the flexibility
8. U.C.C. § 2-302.
9. See id. § 2-302(1).
10. In contrast, U.C.C. section 1-203, which governs the doctrine of good faith, provides
that "every [U.C.C.] contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-.203 (1990). Therefore, if a contract for the sale of
goods is challenged on the ground that a seller or buyer acted in bad faith, the alleged bad faith
must have existed at the time the sale contract was performed or enforced, not at the time the
contract was signed. Thus, events that occur after a contract is made are relevant for the
purpose of a good faith analysis, but irrelevant for the purpose of an unconscionability analy-
sis. Glopak Corp. v. United States, 851 F.2d 334 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Ellinghaus, supra
note 7, at 803.
11. U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
12. See id § 1-203.
13. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL., COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE U.C.C.
6.02(2)(d)(ii) n.11 (1985).
14. Id.
15. See U.C.C. § 2-302(2); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 4-3, at 185 (3d ed. 1988). "Sua sponte" means that a court can raise the
issue of unconscionability by its own will, without the motion of a party to the suit. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).
16. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (emphasis added).
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given courts in raising the question of unconscionability reflects its
equitable origins.
Fourth, as mentioned above, section 2-302(2) requires that a
court allow the parties to present evidence regarding the commercial
setting, purpose, and effect of a contract in order to aid the court in
determining whether unconscionability exists. 17 This commercial evi-
dence can give needed context to business practices that might other-
wise appear harsh. For example, a price term in a contract for sale
may appear excessive when viewed in isolation. A seller of goods,
however, may be able to show that unusually high manufacturing or
production costs justified the high price term in the sale contract.
Finally, section 2-302 gives a court a wide range of remedial op-
tions once it finds unconscionability. The court "may refuse to en-
force the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable re-
sult.' 8 Courts that have construed this language have ruled that the
section does not permit an award of money damages upon a finding of
unconscionability. 19 A court's inability to award money damages
when a sale contract is held unconscionable leads to anomalous re-
sults. For example, if a party tries to enjoin enforcement of a letter of
credit contract based on fraud, U.C.C. section 5-114(2) and its accom-
panying case law require the party to first prove that without an in-
junction the party will be irreparably injured by the letter of credit
payment. 20 This usually requires the party seeking the injunction to
prove that an award of money damages would not adequately remedy
17. Id. In this sense, U.C.C. section 2-302(2) seems to further one of the underlying
policies of the U.C.C.: to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties. See id. § 1-102(2) (1990). If the commercial
setting of a contractual term can be used to rebut an unconscionability challenge, permitting
the use of such evidence in this context furthers the significance and importance of commercial
practices as found in custom, usage, and agreement of the parties. Case law has held, however,
that U.C.C. section 2-302(2) does not require a formal hearing on the question of unconsciona-
bility, so long as the necessary commercial evidence is in the record. See, e.g., Golden Reward
Mining Co. v. Jervis B. Well Co., 772 F. Supp. 1118 (D.S.D. 1991).
18. U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
19. See, e.g., Galvin v. First Nat'l Monetary Corp., 624 F. Supp. 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. Div. 1984).
20. See U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1990); see, e.g., Foxboro Co. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 805
F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1986); Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344
(11th Cir. 1982); Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Mass. 1981), vacated,
704 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983), on remand, 566 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd, 708 F.2d 19
(lst Cir. 1984).
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the party's grievance. 2' Since money damages will remedy most com-
mercial contract-related grievances, the overwhelming majority of
parties seeking injunctive relief under section 5-114(2) will fail to sat-
isfy this irreparable injury requirement, and thus will not be awarded
injunctions. However, if a party tries to convince a court to refuse to
enforce a contract based on unconscionability, the section 2-302 judi-
cial prohibition on awarding money damages effectively frees a party
from satisfying the irreparable injury requirement. Therefore, if a
party simply proves unconscionability by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, a court has the power to refuse to enforce the tainted contract.
The case law construing section 2-302 seems to require this result,22
although this may not have been the result intended by the U.C.C.
drafters.
By now, however, one thing should be obvious. While section 2-
302 reveals much about the clothing of unconscionability, it reveals
little about the nature of the doctrine beneath that clothing. Section
2-302 does not contain a definition, or even a standard, to determine
whether the terms of a contract are in fact unconscionable. In the
Official Comments to section 2-302, the drafters did provide some gui-
dance as to the nature of unconscionability, but even here the gui-
dance is less than optimal. For example, Official Comment 1 states
that the principle underlying unconscionability is "the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of
risks because of superior bargaining power."' 23 At another place in
Official Comment 1, the drafters describe the "basic test" of uncon-
scionability as whether the clauses are "so one-sided" as to be uncon-
scionable. 24 In a third place, the drafters state that the underlying
basis of U.C.C. section 2-302 is illustrated by the results in ten Eng-
lish and United States cases, mainly from the 1920s and 1930s. 25
21. See, e.g., Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Israel, 670 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1982); Interco, Inc. v.
First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 560 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1977); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden
Apartments, 250 N.W.2d 172 (Minn. 1977).
22. See, e.g., Galvin, 624 F. Supp. at 158 (stating that U.C.C. section 2-302 "merely gives
the court the right of refusal to enforce an unconscionable contract. It makes no provision for
damages, and none may be recovered thereunder.").
23. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
24. Id. Official Comment 1 states, "The basic test is whether, in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time
of the making of the contract." Id.
25. Id. (citing and discussing Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing
Corp., 73 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1937); Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 144 S.E. 327
(Ga. Ct. App. 1928); Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co., [1934] 1 K.B. 17 (Eng.); New Prague
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None of these explications, however, is particularly helpful in predict-
ing the outcome of cases in which parties seek to be excused on the
ground of unconscionability.
After reviewing section 2-302 and its Official Comments, it is evi-
dent that the drafters never intended to provide a definition of uncon-
scionability. To the contrary, they wished to leave the doctrine of
unconscionability essentially indeterminate-something to be defined
in the context of each case.26
B. The Two-Pronged Analysis of Unconscionability
If the drafters of the U.C.C. left the definition of unconscionabil-
ity indeterminate, scholarly literature has at least provided an analyti-
cal framework to assist in applying unconscionability. Perhaps the
most influential discussion of unconscionability is found in an article
written by Professor Arthur Leff of Yale Law School, entitled Uncon-
scionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause.27 Leff inter-
prets U.C.C. section 2-302 unconscionability as comprising two
distinct components.
1. The First Prong: Procedural Unconscionability
The first prong of unconscionability analysis, referred to as "pro-
cedural unconscionability," deals with what Leff calls "bargaining
naughtiness. ' 2  To determine whether procedural unconscionability
exists, a court should consider various factors, including (1) the age,
literacy, and business sophistication of the party claiming unconscio-
nability (usually the buyer); (2) the bargaining tactics of the other
party to the contract (usually the seller); and (3) the commercial set-
ting of the sales contract, particularly whether the buyer could have
obtained the goods from an alternative source.29 Textual support for
"procedural unconscionability" can be found in the Official Com-
Flouring Mill Co. v. G.A. Spears, 189 N.W. 815 (Iowa 1922); Kansas Flour Mills Co. v.
Dirks, 164 P. 273 (Kan. 1917); Green v. Arcos, Ltd. [1931] 47 T.L.R. 336 (Eng.); Meyer v.
Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 140 N.E. 118 (Ohio 1922); Austin Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co., 209
P. 131 (Or. 1922); Bekkevold v. Potts, 216 N.W. 790 (Minn. 1927); Robert A. Munroe & Co.
v. Meyer, [1930] 2 K.B. 312 (Eng.)) (cases listed in order of Official Comment discussion).
26. Indeed, some commentators argue that it is not even possible to define unconsciona-
bility because "[i]t is not a concept but a determination to be made in light of a variety of
factors not unifiable into a formula." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 4-3, at 186 (em-
phasis added).
27. Leff, supra note 4, at 485.
28. Id. at 487.
29. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 13, 6.02(2)(d)(iii).
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ment's phrase "unfair surprise. 30 If age or literacy precludes a buyer
from giving meaningful assent to the terms of a sale contract, then it
is fair to conclude that the buyer will be unfairly surprised by the
terms of that contract. Similarly, if a seller's boilerplate language is so
deceptive or convoluted that it prevents a buyer from meaningfully
assenting to the terms of the contract, then again it is fair to conclude
that the buyer will be unfairly surprised.
2. The Second Prong: Substantive Unconscionability
The second prong of unconscionability analysis identified by Leff
is "substantive unconscionability. ' 31 Substantive unconscionability
examines the nature of the terms that result from the bargaining pro-
cess.32 Textual support for this second component is rooted in the
words "oppression" and "one-sided" found in Official Comment 1 to
U.C.C. section 2-302. 33 Most courts find excessively high prices and
unfair remedy terms, including broad disclaimer of warranty provi-
sions, substantively unconscionable because they are harsh and op-
pressive to buyers.34
3. The Indeterminate Nature of the Two-Pronged Analysis
It is important to remember that this two-pronged analytical
framework for unconscionability is just that-an analytical frame-
work. It does not, and indeed cannot, substitute for a definition of
unconscionability. In fact, the two prongs-procedural unconsciona-
bility and substantive unconscionability-are themselves indetermi-
nate. For example, the existing case law on procedural
unconscionability has not catalogued the factors that must be consid-
ered before a court will find "bargaining naughtiness. 35 Even when
30. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1; see Davenport, supra note 7, at 138.
31. Leff, supra note 4, at 509.
32. Id.
33. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1; 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SERIES § 2-302:04 (1982 & 1992 Supp.).
34. See, e.g., Esquire Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Arrendale, 356 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. App. Ct.
1987) (disclaimer of warranties); Zepp v. Mayor & Council of Athens, 348 S.E.2d 674 (Ga.
App. Ct. 1986) (excessively high prices); First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Mountain View
Equip. Co., 730 P.2d 1078 (Idaho App. Ct. 1986) (waiver clause in guarantee agreement);
Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. App. Ct. 1987)
(lease terms unreasonably favorable to lessor); see also 2 HAWKLAND, supra note 33, § 2-
302:04. One should also note that U.C.C. section 2-719(3) states that limitations of conse-
quential damages for personal injury in consumer goods cases are prima facie unconscionable.
See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1990).
35. 2 HAWKLAND, supra note 33, § 2-302:04.
1992]
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relevant factors are listed, the case law does not indicate what weight
should be afforded to each of these factors. 36 Further, given that no
precise definition of procedural unconscionability exists, courts are
basically free to pick and choose among a range of factors in order to
achieve a fair result.
The same can be said of substantive unconscionability. The Offi-
cial Comment to U.C.C. section 2-302 states that the principle of un-
conscionability is "one of the prevention of oppression . ..not of
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power."' 37 Obviously, superior bargaining power can produce a one-
sided allocation of risks. The Official Comment, however, fails to pro-
vide courts with a bright-line distinction between oppressive, and
therefore unconscionable, contractual terms, and burdensome, but
still acceptable, contractual terms resulting from superior bargaining
power. Therefore, courts again have great freedom to determine
when contractual terms are not only burdensome but oppressive, and
thus substantively unconscionable.
The indeterminacy that exists when procedural and substantive
unconscionability are considered separately also exists when they are
considered in combination. Most courts and scholarly commentators
are of the view that before there can be a finding of section 2-302
unconscionability, both procedural and substantive unconscionability
must be present.38 Others, however, believe that section 2-302 uncon-
scionability can be found when substantive unconscionability alone is
present. 39
In conclusion, it should be clear that the drafters of the U.C.C.
intentionally left the definition of unconscionability indeterminate.
Thus, unconscionability serves as a useful policing mechanism by al-
36. Cf. Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy: An Argument for
Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815, 816 (1987).
37. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
38. See, e.g., Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111, 114 (D.C. 1971)
("We hold that the two elements of which unconscionability is comprised; namely, an absence
of meaningful choice and contract terms unreasonably favorable to the other party, must be
particularized in some detail ...."); Kohl v. Bay Colony Condominium Inc., 38 So. 2d 865
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Mobile Am. Corp. v. Howard, 307 So. 2d 507, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) ("Of those cases dealing with price at all, most require in addition to a grossly
excessive price, some element of nondisclosure, fraud, overreaching or manifestly unequal bar-
gaining position."); HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 13, 6.02(1); WHITE & SUMMERS, Supra
note 15, § 4-8, at 199-200. But see American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 201 A.2d
886 (N.H. 1964); Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970).
39. See, e.g., Remco Enter. v. Houston, 677 P.2d 567 (Kan. 1984); American Home Im-
provement, Inc., 221 A.2d at 886; Toker, 274 A.2d at 78.
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lowing courts to excuse consumers from contractual obligations
whenever they perceive irregularities or substantive unfairness in the
bargaining process.
III. IMPRACTICABILrrY
A. Overview
Like unconscionability, impracticability is an important Article 2
policing provision.40 It is defined in section 2-615 of the U.C.C.,
which provides in relevant part:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation...
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a
seller ... is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occur-
rence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made .... 41
Several initial observations can be made about the doctrine of
impracticability. First, on its face, section 2-615 appears to apply
only to sellers, as it begins with the words "[e]xcept so far as a seller
may have assumed a greater obligation .... "42 However, courts and
commentators have adopted the position that the impracticability de-
fense is equally available to buyers.
43
Second, Official Comment 8 to section 2-615 states that "[tihe
provisions of this section are made subject to assumption of greater
liability by agreement." 4 Consistent with this language, a seller can
agree to deliver goods absolutely and unconditionally, regardless of
any supervening contingency, and the impracticability defense will
not apply. 45
Third, section 2-615 states that it is subject to the provisions of
40. "Impracticability" is a doctrine under which a party to a contract is relieved of his or
her duty to perform when the premise upon which the contract was based no longer exists due
to unforeseeable circumstances. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (6th ed. 1990).
41. U.C.C. § 2-615.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See id. § 2-615 cmt. 9; Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa
1976); Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986);
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 3-9, at 157.
44. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8.
45. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stone, 127 N.Y. 500 (1891) ("[W]here an absolute executory
contract is made, [a party] is not excused by an inability to execute it by unforeseen accident or
misfortune."). A court, however, using normal rules of contract interpretation, will have to
determine whether contractual language containing words such as "absolute" and "uncondi-
tional" are, in fact, unambiguous expressions of the intent of the seller.
1992] 447
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section 2-614 on substituted performance. 46 Thus, in a sale contract,
a party will not normally be excused from performance if the agreed
means or manner of delivery of the goods "becomes commercially im-
practicable but a commercially reasonable substitute is available."
47
In such instances, commercially reasonable substituted performances
must be tendered and accepted by both parties to the sale contract.
48
B. The Two-Pronged Analysis of Impracticability
Even a cursory reading of section 2-615, however, reveals that
the section does not provide a clear definition of impracticability.
Still, when compared to the text of section 2-302, which fails to pro-
vide much guidance on the nature of unconscionability, 49 the text of
section 2-615 at least provides an analytical framework that courts
can use in applying the impracticability doctrine.
The analysis typically applied in impracticability cases can be il-
lustrated by a hypothetical. Imagine a long-term sales contract in
which the seller agrees to sell the buyer 200,000 copper widgets over a
ten year period. In the first year, the contract price of a copper widget
is $30, with the price increasing by $1 in each of the succeeding nine
years. The seller agrees to this price structure, expecting that its pres-
ent manufacturing costs of $18 per widget will not exceed $20 during
the life of the ten-year contract. In the fourth year of the contract,
however, when each copper widget is selling for $33, the seller's man-
ufacturing costs unexpectedly rise to $40 per widget due to an em-
bargo on copper shipments imposed by a cartel of copper-producing
countries. The seller brings a declaratory judgment action to be re-
lieved of its obligation to sell the buyer widgets at $33 per widget.
The seller argues that its dramatic rise in manufacturing costs was
completely unforeseeable at the time the contract was executed and,
therefore, could not have been guarded against in the sale contract.
Assuming the seller did not "assume a greater obligation"-that
is, assuming the seller did not agree to sell the widgets at the stated
price absolutely and unconditionally without regard to any future
contingencies5O-a court will typically apply a two-pronged analysis
to determine whether the seller should be excused from performance
46. U.C.C. § 2-615.
47. See id. § 2-614(1) (1990).
48. Id.
49. For a discussion of unconscionability under U.C.C. section 2-312, see supra notes 7-
39 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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under U.C.C. section 2-615. 51
I. The First Prong: An Unforeseeable Contingency
The first prong of the impracticability analysis asks whether the
dramatic rise in the seller's manufacturing costs was "a contingency
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made."5 2 To determine this, courts typically consider
whether the contingency was reasonably foreseeable at the time the
contract was made. 53 If the contingency was reasonably foreseeable,
the seller will not be excused from performance, because the seller
could have guarded against the occurrence of the contingency by in-
cluding appropriate exculpatory language in the contract.54 To estab-
lish whether an increase in costs was foreseeable at the time the
contract was made, courts will consider various factors, including the
business sophistication of the seller and the specific risks to which the
seller agreed in the sales contract. 55
With regard to the hypothetical at hand, given the price volatility
of most commodities during the past several decades, it is unlikely
that a court will find that a dramatic increase in manufacturing costs
over a ten year period was unforeseeable to a sophisticated manufac-
turer of copper widgets. Therefore, since the seller-manufacturer
could have foreseen the dramatic increase in costs but failed to guard
against it in the contract, a court will likely rule that the seller-manu-
facturer assented to sell the goods at the price stated in the contract
despite any increases in the costs of manufacturing the goods. If so,
the seller-manufacturer will not be excused from performance. If,
however, a court rules that the increase in the cost of manufacturing
copper widgets was not reasonably foreseeable at the time the con-
tract was made, it will likely find that the seller-manufacturer did not
agree to sell at that price, and that, therefore, the seller-manufacturer
51. See Stephen J. Sirianni, The Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and Im-
possibility: Part I1, 14 U.C.C. L.J. 146, 157 (1981).
52. U.C.C. § 2-615(a).
53. See, e.g., Bernina Distribs., Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Mach. Co., 646 F.2d 434 (10th
Cir. 1981); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 3-9, at 129-30.
54. See, e.g., Kel Kim Corp. v. Central Markets, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1987).
55. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Chesapeake Shoe Co., 21 B.R. 604 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding
that a fall in shoe prices was a risk factored into contract price); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mont.) (holding that because the possibility of an oil
embargo was discussed by the government, businesses, and media, it was common knowledge
and thus foreseeable), cert denied, 446 U.S. 865 (1979); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 15, § 3-9, at 161-64.
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satisfied the first prong of the impracticability test. It would be unu-
sual, however, for a court to find that a possible increase in costs over
the life of a long-term contract was not a reasonably foreseeable
contingency. 5
6
2. The Second Prong: The Fairness of Requiring Performance in
Light of the Unforeseen Contingency
The second prong of the impracticability analysis considers
whether performance of a contract has been made impracticable by
the occurrence of an unforeseen contingency. 57 To meet this require-
ment, a seller must show more than the fact that performance has
been made financially difficult or even onerous. Rather, a court will
likely require the seller to show extreme financial difficulty. 58 How-
ever, the case law does not provide a standard to measure the precise
level of financial difficulty that merits excuse. Ultimately, a court will
have to decide whether, under the particular set of circumstances, it
would be unfair to require continued performance on the part of the
seller. In this regard, the second prong of the impracticability test is
also indeterminate in nature.
IV. A COMPARISON OF UNCONSCIONABILITY AND
IMPRACTICABILITY
Upon close examination, one discovers that the two prongs of the
impracticability analysis59 resemble the two prongs of the unconscio-
nability analysis.6° The first prong of the impracticability analysis,
foreseeability, and the first prong of unconscionability analysis, proce-
dural unconscionability, both focus on the assent of the party seeking
to be excused from performance. In the case of impracticability,
courts examine whether the supervening contingency was sufficiently
foreseeable at the time the contract was signed. 6' If it was, and if the
party seeking excuse did not include appropriate exculpatory lan-
guage in the contract, that party will be deemed to have assented to
56. As has been pointed out, it is difficult "to wield the sword of commercial impractica-
bility." Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
57. U.C.C. § 2-615(a).
58. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1324
(E.D. La. 1981).
59. For a discussion of impracticability under U.C.C. section 2-615, see supra notes 40-58
and accompanying text.
60. For a discussion of unconscionability under U.C.C. section 2-302, see supra notes 7-
39 and accompanying text.
61. See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8; see also supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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perform despite the occurrence of the supervening contingency. In
the case of unconscionability, courts look to see if, at the time the
contract was signed, the party seeking excuse had a meaningful choice
as to the terms of the contract.62 If the party did not have a meaning-
ful choice and, therefore, did not assent to the terms of the contract,
the party will be excused from performance.
The second prong of the impracticability analysis and the second
prong of the unconscionability analysis both focus on whether it is
fair to require continued performance by the party seeking to be ex-
cused.63 Since these fairness analyses are essentially indeterminate,
courts will necessarily act as chancellors, and apply their own views
of what is fair and equitable under the particular set of circumstances.
Although unconscionability and impracticability are both doc-
trines of essentially indeterminate definition, courts apply them very
differently. Courts frequently excuse performance on the ground of
unconscionability, but rarely excuse performance on the ground of
impracticability." Three major differences between the doctrines of
impracticability and unconscionability account for this distinction: (1)
a difference in the typical type of transactions in which each doctrine
is raised; (2) a difference in the conduct of the parties opposing ex-
cuse; and (3) the fact that a party can waive the impracticability de-
fense, but cannot waive the unconscionability defense.
A. Type of Transaction
Unconscionability is usually claimed by buyers of goods in con-
sumer sales transactions. 65 In such cases, courts have a natural ten-
dency to find unconscionability because the party claiming
unconscionability is a consumer, not a sophisticated business
person. 66
62. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1; see also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 31-34, 57-58 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 415 F. Supp. at 438; Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
517 F. Supp. at 1319.
65. See 2 HAWKLAND, supra note 33, § 2-302:06.
66. See, e.g., Keystone Aeronautics v. R.J. Enstrom, 499 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974).
Courts do not usually excuse a party on unconscionability grounds in commercial contracts
between merchants or experienced business entities. See, e.g., Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. Na-
tional Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3rd Cir. 1980); Golden Reward Mining Co. v.
Jervis B. Webb Co., 772 F. Supp. 1118 (D.S.D. 1991); Martin v. Shafer, 403 S.E.2d 555 (N.C.
Ct. App 1991); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 521 N.Y.S.2d 729 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd,
73 N.Y.2d 1 (1988); K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 263 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1970). On
occasions where courts do permit excuse on unconscionability grounds in a commercial con-
tract, it is usually because one of the entities, while technically a merchant, is functionally a
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The opposite frequently occurs in impracticability cases. Sellers
usually claim impracticability in long-term commercial sales transac-
tions.67 In these cases, courts usually refuse to excuse performance
because sellers in long-term sales contracts tend to be sophisticated
parties.68 As such, they could have dealt with the problem of unfore-
seen contingencies through exculpatory language in the sales contract.
In addition, generally the seller prepares the sales contract. There-
fore, in impracticability cases, courts often stretch to find that the
seller has assumed the risk that the supervening contingency would
not occur.
Thus, although both doctrines focus on the assent of the party
seeking to be excused from the contract, courts rarely excuse perform-
ance based on impracticability, but frequently excuse performance
based on unconscionability. The model paradigmatic unconscionabil-
ity case versus the model paradigmatic impracticability case largely
accounts for these different results. Social policy protects the impru-
dent consumer-buyer more readily than the imprudent merchant-
seller. Similarly, the unconscionability doctrine is usually not raised
in long-term sale contracts where certain and predictable contractual
expectations are an important social policy. Impracticability, how-
ever, is frequently raised in long-term sale contracts where this same
important social policy militates against granting excuse based on
impracticability.
B. Conduct of the Party Opposing Excuse
Unconscionability cases often involve evidence that the party op-
posing excuse, normally a merchant-seller, has engaged in "sharp
practices, ' 69 such as misrepresentation and convoluted or inconspicu-
ous boilerplate language in the seller's form contract. 70 However,
there is usually no evidence of sharp practices in impracticability
cases, since the party against whom the impracticability defense is
raised typically has not contributed to creating the supervening con-
consumer. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Mosca-
tiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equip. Co., 595 A.2d 1190, 1196 n.3 (Pa. 1991).
67. 3 HAWKLAND, supra note 33, § 2-615:05.
68. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 415 F. Supp. at 429.
69. See, e.g., Willie v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906-07 (Kan. 1976)
(examples of sharp business practices by merchants include skillfully drafted boilerplate provi-
sions, penalty clauses, fine print, hidden clauses, and incomprehensible phrasing of contract
provisions).
70. See, e.g., Moscatiello, 595 A.2d at 1190.
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tingency. Therefore, given the existence of sharp practices in many
unconscionability cases, and their absence in impracticability cases,
courts will more likely balance the equities in favor of granting excuse
in unconscionability cases than in impracticability cases.
C Waiver
In an unconscionability case, a consumer-buyer cannot waive the
defense of unconscionability. 71 In an impracticability case, however,
it is possible for a merchant-seller to assume a greater obligation by
waiving the ability to plead excuse based on supervening circum-
stances. 72 This again illustrates the reluctance of the law to allow un-
sophisticated consumers to waive valuable contractual rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Article 2 of the U.C.C. includes provisions covering both uncon-
scionability and impracticability. A determination of unconscionabil-
ity under U.C.C. section 2-302 is the product of a two-pronged
analysis. The first prong focuses on procedural unconscionability, to
determine whether the contract negotiation and execution process de-
prived a party from giving meaningful assent to the terms of a con-
tract. The second prong focuses on substantive unconscionability, to
determine whether the terms of a contract are unduly one-sided or
oppressive.
Similarly, a determination of impracticability under U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-615 is also the product of a two-pronged analysis. The first
prong focuses on whether a contingency was foreseeable when the
contract was signed. The second prong considers whether it is fair to
require performance in light of an unforeseen contingency.
Although the two-pronged unconscionability and impracticabil-
ity analyses appear notably similar, and although both doctrines are
indeterminate principles used to police sale contracts, courts are far
more likely to excuse performance on the ground of unconscionability
than on the ground of impracticability. This is because, first, the un-
conscionability doctrine is usually raised by buyers in consumer trans-
actions, whereas the impracticability doctrine is usually raised by
71. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 4-6, at 194-98.
72. U.C.C. section 2-615 is limited in operation by the provision that its rules apply "ex-
cept so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation." U.C.C. § 2-615; see also In-
terpetrol Bermuda Ltd. v. Kaiser Aluminum Int'l Corp., 719 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1983); 3
HAWKLAND, supra note 33, § 2-615:03; supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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sellers in commercial transactions. Social policy in the United States
dictates that imprudent buyer-consumers should be more readily pro-
tected than imprudent, but typically more sophisticated, seller-
merchants. Second, unlike impracticability cases, unconscionability
cases often involve evidence that the party opposing excuse engaged
in sharp business practices, such as including inconspicuous boiler-
plate language in the sale contract. Finally, parties to a contract can-
not waive the unconscionability defense, but can waive the
impracticability defense by foregoing the right to plead excuse based
on supervening circumstances.
